The 2017 hurricane season devastated much of the U.S. gulf coastline, with two of the worst hurricanes in history: Harvey (107 deaths, $125B in damages) and Irma (134 deaths, $50B in damages). Despite extensive warnings and some mandatory evacuations, the majority of affected residents did not evacuate their homes before the storms hit, complicating rescue efforts and recovery. We empirically examine predictors of hurricane evacuations using a large GPS dataset for 2.7 million smartphone users in Florida and Texas. Combined with data at the census-block and voting-precinct level, we find that demographics such as income, education, and race/ethnicity, among others, significantly predict the propensity and speed of evacuation. Interestingly, one of the strongest predictors of willingness to evacuate was the 2016 Democrat/Republican Presidential vote share, but only after the emergence in 2017 of conservativemedia dismissals of hurricane warnings, fueled by climate-change skepticism. Using a spatial regression-discontinuity design, we confirm the causal impact of hurricane advisories by comparing evacuation rates for residents just on opposite sides of county boundaries who received differential hurricane alerts. Our results could help the National Hurricane Center better design and target hurricane warning systems, and assist state and local governments with deploying evacuation assistance to vulnerable populations.
1 Introduction own analysis of the data. . . . Look, the program has to go on. I can sit here and say, ' You know what, I'm gonna stay, I'm gonna ride this out.' (Limbaugh 2017) Limbaugh's dismissal of government warnings represented a discrete change in the politicization of disaster warnings in the United States. Prior to Limbaugh's questioning, we find only occasional instances of "hurricane trutherism" on right-wing blogs, making comparisons of public response before and after his statements a useful difference-in-differences measure of partisan effects on evacuation behavior.
In this paper, we empirically examine evacuation patterns for three hurricanes: Matthew (2016), Harvey (2017), and Irma (2017) . First, we measure predictors of evacuation rates, including the type and timing of storm alerts, as well as demographic and socioeconomic variables. Second, using a spatial regression discontinuity design, we estimate the causal effect of issuing a hurricane or tropical storm watch on rapid evacuation (i.e., within 24 hours). Finally, we test whether evacuation behavior became politically polarized, by using 2016 precinct-level Presidential election results to compare post-Limbaugh Hurricane Irma (after he made the preceding public announcement), versus pre-Limbaugh Hurricanes Matthew and Harvey.
Our dataset is comprised of smartphone location coordinates for millions of U.S. residents, including 378,000 individuals (Matthew), 1.0 million individuals (Harvey), and 1.3 million individuals (Irma). To date, no prior study has empirically measured hurricane evacuation patterns with such a large dataset. Our findings are relevant to policymakers, state and local governments, and first responders who must increasingly prepare for catastrophic tropical storms. By anticipating who is unable-or unwilling-to evacuate a approaching hurricane, these agencies could proffer additional information, transportation services, or sheltering to at-risk residents. Larson et al. (2006) outline opportunities within OR/OM to enhance hurricane preparation and response efforts, by generating better prediction forecasts, optimizing evacuation routes, prepositioning emergency supplies, improving communication channels, and initiating rapid rescue efforts.
Related Literature
An extensive literature exists on forecasting the paths of tropical cyclones. NHC provides realtime updates of active storms (NHC, 2019) , and recent modeling advances improved the projections of the high-impact Hurricanes Irma and Maria (Hazelton et al. 2018) . Emanuel (2018) summarizes the scientific advances over the past century as related to tropical cyclone modeling, including evidence of increasing hurricane frequency and potential destructiveness since the 1970s, owed in part to rising ocean surface temperatures (Emanuel 2005) . Regnier (2008) estimates the inverse relationship between evacuation lead-time (typically 12 to 72 hours) and forecast accuracy (ranging from 10% to 85% probability of the hurricane striking)-a trade-off that policymakers must balance before deciding when and where to issue evacuation alerts. Regnier (2018) develops a multi-period probabilistic model of hurricane wind-speeds, taking into account the spatial correlation across neighboring geographic areas.
Many stakeholders participate in hurricane preparedness, including the NHC (issues watches and warnings), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (distributes food, water and other relief to hurricane victims), as well as city and county-level offices (issues mandatory or voluntary evacuation orders). Stakeholders often face competing objectives, and must balance the risk of Type I error-a false alarm-and Type II error-failing to issue an alert before a hurricane hits (Dye et al. 2014 ). This paper finds empirical evidence that false alarms can lead to increases in the opposite error-an unpredicted hurricane hit-in subsequent periods, perhaps because stakeholders overcompensate.
An overview of discrete optimization models for disaster management is given by McLay (2015) .
Topics include supply pre-positioning, evacuation planning, search and rescue, and infrastructure repair and recovery. Bayram and Yaman (2017) extend an early paper by Sherali et al. (1991) to optimize emergency shelter locations and assign residents to specific shelters, to minimize total evacuation time. Guikema et al. (2014) develop a random forest model to predict hurricane-related power outages by spatial region, taking into account wind speeds and other topographic factors.
Such a model could be used by stakeholders to prioritize post-hurricane repair efforts.
Finally, several papers in the behavioral literature have examined why some residents choose to not evacuate. Dash and Gladwin (2007) structure the evacuation decision based on an individual's interpretation of the storm warning, the subjective assessment of risk to person or property, and the encoding of this information to make a rational-choice. One study involving 79 survivors of the catastrophic 2005 Hurricane Katrina summarizes how perceptions of individual agency differed between evacuees and non-evacuees (Stephens et al. 2009 ). Based on a survey with approximately 500 responses following Hurricane Lili in 2003, Tinsley et al. (2012) find that respondents who had prior experience with an unnecessary evacuation-known as a near miss-are less likely to evacuate a future hurricane, an effect corroborated in lab experiments. Several papers investigate why people often fail to take protective measures-even when informed about the costs and risks of disasters, including from personal experiences. Meyer (2012) finds that, consistent with reinforcement-learning rules, people under-invest in hurricane preparedness because they overweight recent experience and realized versus avoided losses. Kunreuther et al. (2013) similarly show that homeowners locate in high hurricane-risk areas and policymakers under-invest in mitigation, largely through under-attending to rare, low-probability but high-consequence, risks.
Our paper offers three key contributions to the literature. First, our study is the first to observe actual evacuation behavior for millions of residents hit by at least one major hurricane. Whereas behavioral surveys may suffer from biases, including imperfect recall of evacuation timing or expost rationalization of decisions, our location data provide direct measurements of travel patterns during emergencies. Second, we empirically estimate the causal impact of issuing hurricane or tropical storm alerts on evacuation behavior, by comparing similar individuals who reside across county border lines using a novel geospatial regression-discontinuity design. Finally, understanding how people process and respond to catastrophic storm warnings is important for policymakers tasked with issuing storm alerts. Given the increasingly politically polarized climate in the U.S., we examine whether individuals who reside in predominantly Democrat or Republican precinctsas measured by 2016 U.S. Presidential vote shares-differ in their hurricane evacuation propensity.
We compare whether this effect, controlling for spatial and demographic factors, differs over time, especially in response to a conservative-media hurricane-denialism movement which gained traction in the run-up to Hurricane Irma in 2017.
3 Data Summary
Smartphone Data
Our primary dataset consists of anonymized smartphone location data for approximately 30 million U.S. residents, collected by the geospatial data firm SafeGraph. Each observation (known as a "ping") includes an anonymous user ID, date and time, latitude and longitude coordinates, and location accuracy. Each smartphone typically generates pings multiple times per hour, with more frequent pings if the smartphone is physically moving.
We utilize a subset of the smartphone data over a period of approximately three weeks for each hurricane analyzed, as follows. The earliest alerts in Florida for Hurricane Irma were issued on September 7, 2017, as illustrated in Figure 1 (NHC, 2019) . For each smartphone user (n = 1, 321, 571 for Hurricane Irma), we examine all pings over a one-week period, at least 10 days before the first hurricane alerts. We compute a user's "home block" as their modal location between 10pm and 6am over this period, aggregated to the level of a geohash-7 code, a spatial aggregate which preserves anonymity and has an average accuracy of 76 meters.
For each smartphone user, we define an "evacuation" as an individual spending >24 continuous hours (Evacuation24h) at least 100 meters away from their home block, over a time window starting four days before the first hurricane alert (September 3, 2017 for Irma) until four days after the last alert ends (September 15, 2017) . This definition captures early evacuees and is consistent across the entire state of Florida. We also consider a more conservative > 48-hour definition (Evacuation48h), with results summarized in the Appendix. Using these same definitions, we process the smartphone data for Hurricane Matthew in Florida (n = 378, 248, first alert on October 
Demographic, Geographic, and Political Data
We merge each user's home block with U.S. Census demographic data at the tract, block group, or block level. Tract and block group data come from the 2012-16 American Community Survey while block data comes from the 2010 Decennial Census. Variables include residential density (U rban, Suburban, Rural), median household age (CensusAge), median household income (CensusIncome), fraction with a college degree or higher (CensusCollege), employment rate (CensusEmploy), and race/ethnicity (CensusBlack, CensusAsian, CensusHispanic, CensusW hite). All variables are summarized in we include all smartphone users in Florida, but for Hurricane Harvey, we exclude users who live more than 300km from the coast, as they did not receive any hurricane alerts and were not in the path of the storm.
Finally, we merge our dataset with the 2016 U.S. Presidential election precinct-level results (the finest granularity legally permitted), specified as the two-party vote share won by Hillary Clinton (ClintonShare) (Rohla 2018) . For every smartphone user, we also include the number of local radio stations, defined by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) contour maps of interference-free broadcast (FCC, 2018) , which air the Rush Limbaugh Show (LimbaughStations) (Limbaugh 2018) . This value ranges from zero to eight in Florida and Texas.
Empirical Specifications
Timely evacuation of residents living in a hurricane's path is a primary goal of policymakers, emergency service departments, and first-responders. We estimate the speed of evacuation following a hurricane (or tropical storm) watch or warning, using the following time-varying Cox proportional hazards model: The remaining time-varying covariates, HurricaneW arning i (t), T ropicalW atch i (t), and T ropicalW arning i (t), are similarly defined. For each county, at most one alert is in effect at time t:
The time-varying assumption allows us to estimate the magnitude of a temporary storm alert on the baseline evacuation rate λ 0 . Static covariates (X i ) include demographic, geographic, and census controls (Table 1 ) and the binary variable F irstAlertM orning i (t) where: We use the above specification for Hurricane Matthew. For Hurricane Harvey, all alerts were issued in the morning so we omit F irstM orningAlert(t). For Hurricane Irma, tropical storm alerts were only issued several days after a hurricane watch or warning so we omit T ropicalW atch(t) and T ropicalW arning(t). Exact dates and times of storm alerts are provided in the Appendix.
Estimating the effect of issuing a hurricane watch on evacuation behavior poses challenges due to endogeneity (e.g., observed wind or precipitation changes are correlated with the NHC's timing of issuing alerts and may themselves trigger an evacuation) and omitted variable bias. News programming, social media, peer-to-peer communications, and traffic congestion, for example, occur concurrently with NHC alerts and may also affect evacuation propensity.
To address these issues, we propose a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD), exploiting the fact that NHC alerts are issued at the county-level. Conceptually, suppose two individuals reside within a kilometer of one another-but in different counties-such that one receives a hurricane watch 12 hours in advance of the other. We examine the extent to which the earlier alert affects rapid evacuation behavior (i.e., within 24 hours). We focus on rapid evacuation because the NHC typically upgrades hurricane watches to hurricane warnings within 12 to 24 hours, and we aim to estimate the causal effect of the initial watch.
We specify the following linear RDD model:
where Y i corresponds to individual i evacuating within 24 hours of the hurricane watch, X c refers to the cut-off (i.e., the county border), and X i is the running variable (i.e., the distance between individual i's home and the county border). HurricaneW atch i is a binary variable indicating whether individual i resides in a county that received a hurricane watch:
The coefficient τ represents the local average treatment effect (of a hurricane watch versus no watch) at the cut-off. The remaining coefficients, β 0 , β 1 , and β 2 represent the intercept, slope before the cut-off, and slope after the cut-off, respectively. We follow the approach of Calonico et al. (2014) to estimate a locally-linear functional form. This estimator restricts the sample to those individuals living within a "bandwidth" of the border, where bandwidth selection is based on MSE-optimal point estimation.
We employ this RDD specification for Hurricane Irma, using the border between Martin (n = 11, 208) and Palm Beach (n = 83, 707) counties in Florida (Figure 1 and Appendix Figure A2 ). We considered other potential RDD sites, but all other locations were either too sparsely populated (e.g., Dixie and Levy counties), or had covariates that differ discontinuously across the county border (e.g., Pinellas and Manatee counties are separated by Tampa Bay and the 7-km long Sunshine Skyway Bridge; thus, individuals living on one side of the bridge may face longer expected evacuation times, and may compensate by evacuating earlier).
We use a similar specification for Hurricane Harvey, with the border between Galveston (n = 28, 437) and Brazoria (n = 26, 510) counties as the discontinuity (Figure 1 and Appendix Figure   A3 ). On August 23, 2017 at 10am, Brazoria county received a hurricane watch and neighboring Galveston county received a tropical storm watch. In this case, the local average treatment effect refers to the difference between a hurricane watch and tropical storm watch on rapid evacuations.
Our final specification examines whether evacuation behavior differs by likely political affiliation.
We estimate the following logistic regression:
where p is probability of any >24-hour evacuation during the hurricane. ClintonShare i refers to the precinct-level two-party vote share won by Hillary Clinton during the 2016 Presidential election, and LimbaughStations i refers to the number of local radio stations broadcasting the Rush Limbaugh show. The vector X i includes demographic, geographic, and census controls for individual i (Table 1) .
Results

Evacuation Rates
Of the 1.3 million smartphone users in our 2017 Florida sample, 37% evacuated their home for >24 hours during Hurricane Irma, with 31% evacuating for >48 hours (Table 1) . Approximately 73% reside in a county that received a hurricane watch or warning for Irma, with 51% receiving their first alert in the morning (Table 1) . Across the state, 20%-more than half of all evacuees-left their homes before a local hurricane watch was issued, and those living in southern Florida-where Irma first made landfall-more often waited until after receiving the alert (Figure 2 ). Approximately 85% of evacuees departed their homes between 6am and 9pm.
Only 16% of the 378,000 Florida residents in our 2016 dataset evacuated for >24 hours during Hurricane Matthew, in part because fewer residents (35%) reside in counties that received a hurricane watch compared to Irma. Almost 4% of all residents-and one-quarter of all evacueesdeparted before a storm alert was issued.
In Texas, Hurricane Harvey saw similar overall evacuation rates (33% evacuated for >24 hours and 26% evacuated for >48 hours), despite only 9% of the 1.0 million users in our dataset receiving a hurricane watch or warning. Harris County, for example, which includes Houston, received only tropical storm alerts. Of those who eventually received a hurricane or tropical storm watchprimarily the coastal counties of Texas-only 2% evacuated before the first local alert was issued, significantly lower than in Florida.
Using the Cox proportional hazards model, we find that evacuation rates increase following any storm alert. In general, warnings trigger faster evacuations than watches, as do hurricane alerts versus tropical storm alerts (Table 2) . With Irma, the hazard ratio for a hurricane warning (HR = 1.285, p < 0.0001) exceeds that of a hurricane watch (HR = 1.103, p < 0.0001), controlling for other covariates. For Hurricanes Matthew and Harvey, we observe similar effects, with a sizable effect of a hurricane warning in Texas (HR = 2.796, p < 0.0001), although the ten coastal counties receiving this warning comprise less than 5% of our sample (Appendix Figure A1 ).
Among counties where the first alert occurs in the morning (12am-12pm), evacuation rates further increase during Irma (HR = 1.464, p < 0.0001) and Matthew (HR = 1.245, p < 0.0001), supporting our earlier observation that more people begin evacuating during daytime hours ( Figure   2 ). All of Hurricane Harvey's alerts occurred in the morning; thus this variable is omitted.
As expected, several geographic factors are associated with accelerated evacuation rates. In Across all three hurricanes, areas with older residents experienced slower evacuation rates.
Higher income is also associated with slower evacuation rates, although this coefficient is counteracted by positive effects of education level on evacuation rates. The correlation between CensusIncome and CensusCollege is +0.68 (Florida) and +0.74 (Texas). When CensusCollege is omitted, coefficients for both CensusIncome and CensusEmploy substantially increase.
As a robustness test, we consider a more conservative definition of evacuation as leaving home for >48 hours during the hurricane. Although 3-6% fewer people evacuate under this definition, our general findings remain unchanged (Appendix Table A4 ). (2014), we estimate the optimal RDD bandwidth to be residents living within 2.4km of the county border. Within this sample, the hurricane watch discontinuity increases the probability of evacuating by approximately 8 percentage-points (p < 0.001), and is robust to different variance estimators (Table 3) . That is, Palm Beach residents were discontinuously more likely to evacuate in the 24 hours following their county's hurricane watch, compared to their Martin county neighbors. This suggests that receiving a watch causally and significantly increased evacuation rates, rather than simply being spatially and temporally coincident with imminent hurricane danger.
Causal Effect of Hurricane Watches
One similar discontinuity occurred during Hurricane Harvey. Just before hitting Texas, the first storm alerts were issued on August 23, 2017 at 10am. Residents of coastal Brazoria County received a hurricane watch, while neighboring Galveston County received a lower-grade tropical storm watch at the exact same time (Figure 1 ). Using a similar RDD approach, we estimate that a hurricane watch increased the probability of rapid evacuation by approximately 3 percentagepoints, vis-à-vis a tropical storm watch; however this is only significant at the 0.05-level when we impose bias-corrected variance estimators (Calonico et al. 2014 ).
Political Affiliation
Although Hillary Clinton lost Florida in the 2016 election, our dataset estimates an average value of 50.6% for ClintonShare in Florida, primarily because our sample includes only smartphone users. This under-weights some segments of the population (e.g., older residents) and also includes residents not eligible to vote (e.g., those under age 18, foreign nationals, and ex-felons). Nevertheless, we use precinct-level ClintonShare as a proxy for likely political affiliation of each resident in our sample. Table 4 We also investigate whether the number of local stations broadcasting Limbaugh depresses evacuation behavior, and find statistically significant but quantitatively small effects (OR = 0.970, p < 0.0001). This is likely an underestimate of the direct effect of Limbaugh exposure on evacuations; Appendix Figure A4 shows that virtually all populated areas of Florida receive Limbaugh broadcasts, comprising more than 98% of residents in our sample. Nevertheless, controlling for number of Limbaugh stations does not attenuate the effect of vote share, suggesting that vote share is not correlated with unobserved media availability.
Discussion
Rising ocean temperatures are expected to increase the frequency and intensity of hurricanes, resulting in greater rainfall, flooding, and wind speeds (Patricola and Wehner 2018), a prediction echoed more than a decade ago before the devastating Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana (Webster et al. 2005) . While climate science and tropical cyclone prediction models have drastically improved in recent years (Emanuel 2018) , less attention has been paid to understanding how people behave when facing imminent storm risks. The effectiveness of storm tracking and early warning systems to mitigate catastrophic hurricanes rely on the ability to identify vulnerable populations and facilitate their timely evacuation.
Understanding who evacuates-and when-is critical to effective evacuation management. Our study is the first to empirically examine hurricane evacuation behavior by systematically measuring geospatial movement patterns for millions of smartphone users. Linking this dataset with detailed demographic, geographic, and voting data lends insights into evacuation disparities, and allows us to estimate the causal importance of National Hurricane Center watches and warnings. Our study also suggests that responses to hurricane alerts are strongly influenced by the surrounding political and media environment. Emergent Republican skepticism of climate science, hurricane risks, and government-issued alerts drove an evacuation wedge between Trump and Clinton voters, larger than most other available demographic predictors, and nearly as large as the direct effect of receiving a hurricane watch. While the spatial and temporal patterns of hurricane watches permit only limited use of an RDD, these analyses suggest that at least half of the observed impact of hurricane watches in our primary analyses causally increase evacuation rates. To our knowledge, these analyses provide policymakers with the first in-depth look at hurricane evacuation behavior and its determinants.
Our results offer insights into possible channels for improving evacuation responses. First, we note that alerts issued during the morning (before 12pm) prompt faster evacuations, likely because residents typically depart their homes during daytime hours. Current NHC guidelines indicate that hurricane watches are issued 48 hours in advance of expected wind speeds >74mph
and hurricane warnings are issued 36 hours in advance. Relaxing this criteria, however, could provide residents with additional evacuation lead-time, especially in regions with known traffic congestion or bottlenecks (e.g., major urban areas, the Florida keys).
Second, the Cox proportional hazards model indicates that warnings trigger 20% faster evacuations than watches, and hurricane alerts also result in faster evacuation rates than tropical storm alerts. In particular, hurricane warnings resulted in 80-160% faster rates of evacuation than tropical storm warnings, with the largest effect occurring in southern coastal Texas during Hurricane
Harvey. Evacuation percentages exceeded 60% in several counties (Aransas, Calhoun, Matagorda, Refugio, and San Patricio) that received hurricane watches and warnings, versus 33% in the Hous-ton area and Harris county, which received only a tropical storm watch and subsequent warning, as wind speeds had declined to tropical storm levels (39-73mph) by the time Harvey reached Houston.
Although issuing alerts based on the "hurricane" versus "tropical storm" classification provides consistency and transparency, we must acknowledge that the public perception of this difference is significant, as indicated by higher rates of rapid evacuation following a hurricane watch and higher overall evacuations in these regions. Much of the damage in Houston occurred due to flooding, rather than excessive wind speeds. One recommendation might be to develop a more granular alert system that accounts for wind speed, as the current system does, and flood risk due to both rainfall and storm surge (when seawater moves inland).
Third, we observe key demographic differences in evacuation rates. Residents living in urban areas evacuate more slowly than those in suburban or rural areas, potentially because of differences in vehicle ownership or traffic congestion. We also find that areas with more college graduates evacuate at much greater rates. During Hurricane Irma, for example, Florida residents in the 90th-percentile of education level had significantly higher evacuation rates compared to those in the 10th-percentile (41% vs 34%), controlling for other geographic and demographic factors. Reducing such disparities in evacuation propensity would require a coordinated, concerted effort by federal, state, and local authorities. Providing free mass transportation to the most vulnerable populations, opening additional shelters in populated urban areas, and other measures could help ensure that everyone who wishes to evacuate an impending hurricane is able to do so.
Finally, our analysis highlights that the political discord surrounding climate science and mistrust of government agencies have real consequences, with far fewer residents of Republican-leaning districts choosing to evacuate Hurricane Irma following Rush Limbaugh's public statements expressing suspicion of government-issued alerts. Although the long-term effects of such skepticism remain unknown, improved outreach to key populations and better awareness of the potential dangers of hurricanes are warranted.
Our study has several limitations. Although our dataset measures the movement patterns of millions of residents in Florida and Texas, we do not include people without a smartphone, which likely undersamples the elderly and marginalized populations. Our dataset includes only U.S.
smartphones for 2016-2017, so we limit our analysis to three hurricanes, potentially limiting the generalizability of our results to non-U.S. locations or lower-category tropical cyclones. We define an "evacuation" as departing one's home for >24 hours before or during the storm, to provide a sharp distinction. It is possible, however, that someone left their home but remained in a high-risk area. We also examine a >48-hour definition, and we find that our results remain unchanged.
Finally, in addition to NHC-issued hurricane watches and warnings, state or local agencies can issue mandatory evacuations, typically targeted to very specific populations (e.g., those living in mobile homes or low-lying areas). Because the location accuracy of an individual's home in our data is limited, we cannot systematically examine how such detailed orders affect evacuation rates.
Many factors undoubtedly contribute to an individual evacuating an approaching hurricane, including physical ability, access to transportation and alternative sheltering, and perceived risks.
By abstracting geospatial movement patterns before and during a hurricane using a large smartphone dataset, we gain several insights about the effects of issuing alerts on evacuation rates. Such findings could help policymakers enhance early hurricane advisory systems and, hopefully, improve timely evacuations before hurricanes make landfall. .4
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Probability Hazard ratios reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. * * * p < 0.0001, * * p < 0.001, * p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses. * * * p < 0.0001, * * p < 0.001, * p < 0.01, † p < 0.05 Bandwidth selection based on MSE-optimal point estimation.
Coefficients include conventional variance estimator, bias-corrected with conventional variance estimator, and bias-corrected with robust variance estimator (Calonico et al. 2014 ). Odds ratios reported with standard errors in parentheses. * * * p < 0.0001, * * p < 0.001, * p < 0.01 Figure A2 : Spatial regression discontinuity design for Hurricane Irma. Hazard ratios reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. * * * p < 0.0001, * * p < 0.001, * p < 0.01 Odds ratios reported with standard errors in parentheses. * * * p < 0.0001, * * p < 0.001, * p < 0.01
